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While any extensions of judicial limitation on misuses of the charter
amendment power is more likely to follow the fiduciary duty approach
of the Lebold decision, charter conversions by savings and loan associations present an opportunity to institute a standard of fairness unhampered by the restraints of stare decisis. Minority investors will then be
better safeguarded against discriminatory treatment and deprivation of
their security expectations under the guise of managerial "business
judgment." 53

RIGHTS OF INTERIM CREDITORS
UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Federal bankruptcy legislation, continuously in effect since 1898,
has played an important role in clearing the wreckage left by business
failures. Following the havoc wrought by the depression during the
early nineteen thirties, the emphasis has shifted from liquidation of
insolvent firms to reorganization and rehabilitation. It is thought that
greater benefit will inure, in the long run, to the debtor, his creditors,
and the economic system if the organization is permitted to continue
operation under a readjusted financial structure.'
An important segment of the Federal Bankruptcy Act implementing
this restorative purpose is Chapter XI. 2 The Chapter provides machinery whereby embarrassed debtors, individual or corporate, may work
out an arrangement with creditors. 3 The debtor alone may propose the
plan of arrangement, 4 perhaps with the assistance of a creditors' committee. 5 After acceptance by the creditors, the plan must be submitted
53. Following this writing the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed 4-2, the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Opdyke v. Security Savings and Loan Ass'n, 105 N.E.2d 9
(Ohio 1952). The court confined itself largely to constitutional questions and held
that the problems raised by the valuation of the shares and the change in voting
rights were of fact and there was sufficient evidence for the courts below to find
an absence of fraud. Id. 25-26. They held that a determination of violation of the contract clause need not be decided since the merger of another association with Security
in 1943 constituted the formation of a new corporation subsequent to the statute granting
the power to convert to a federal association.
1. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, BANKRUPTCY AND ARRANGEMENT PROCEEDINGS

1 (1951).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1946).
3. See Rickles, Chapter XI Arrangements,55 Com. L.J. 173 (1950).
4. This should be contrasted with a Chapter X proceeding where the plan is
generally instituted by the trustee or others such as a creditors' committee. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 569, 570 (1946); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, B.AKRUPTCY AND ARRANGEMENT PROCEFDINGS 131 (1951).
5. The creditors' committee may act only in an advisory capacity since it is solely
the function of the debtor to finally propose a satisfactory plan. The debtor must
include a plan as part of his original petition. 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1946).
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to a federal bankruptcy court for confirmation.6 The arrangement,
similar to the common law composition with creditors, should equitably
scale down existing debts to a point consistent with a sound financial
structure and provide a schedule of payment. Confirmation of the plan
binds all creditors existing at the time the petition for the arrangement
is filed, "whether or not they are affected by the arrangement or have
accepted it or have filed their claims, and whether or not their claims
have been scheduled or allowed and are allowable." '7
A considerable period of time may elapse between the petition for
an arrangement and confirmation of the plan adopted. During this
interim period the debtor may be permitted to remain in possession, or
the business may be operated by a court appointed trustee or receiver s
Debts contracted during this period are entitled to full payment under
the plan of arrangement. 9 Should an acceptable plan prove impossible,
or confirmation fail to be achieved, these interim creditors receive first
priority as costs of administration in the resulting bankruptcy.' 0 Such
favorable treatment is justified as necessary to entice credit because of
the uncertainties of continued survival.
However, under the present provisions of the Act, all interim creditors are not assured adequate protection in every situation. An arrangement may fail, after confirmation, due to the default of the debtor in
6. Under Section 366 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1946), it is a condition to confirmation that the court be satisfied of the following matters: (1) that the provisions
of Chapter XI have been complied with; (2) that the arrangement is for the best
interests of the creditors; (3) that the arrangement is fair and equitable and feasible;
(4) that the debtor has not been guilty of any acts or failed to perform any of the
duties which would be a bar to the discharge of a bankrupt; (5) that the proposal and
its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made or procured by any means,
promises, or acts forbidden by the Act. See 8 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY 119.15 (14th ed.,
Stephenson & Seligson, 1941).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 767 (1946). The rights of creditors who have claims existing at
the time the arrangement is instituted are determined under the plan and delineated
thereunder. It is important that these creditors insist that the plan provide for the
retention of jurisdiction by the court until all payments provided for in the plan have
been made, and if possible for reinstatement of their former claims in the event of
nonperformance by the debtor. The Act provides that the court shall retain juris-diction, after confirmation, only if the arrangement so provides. Ibid.
If such a provision is not included the proceedings are dismissed upon confirmation,
and if the debtor subsequently defaults in the payments provided by the plan, these
creditors are left only with actions against the debtor. The discharge releases the
former claims, and, once the proceedings are closed, they can be reopened only for
fraud. See generally, AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, BANKRUPTCY AND ARRANGEMENT
PROCEEDINGS 136, 137 (1951; 8 COLLIER. BANKRUPTCY 1111
9.26-9.34 (14th ed..
Stephenson & Seligson, 1941).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1946).

9. 11 U.S.C. § 767 (1946).
10. This priority is granted under Section 64(a) (1) of the Act, 11 U.S.C.
§104(a)(1) (1946).
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carrying out the terms of the plan," or because of a subsequent failure
of jurisdiction of the court administering the plan. 1 2 The Act does not
clearly provide for the rights of creditors whose claims arise after
confirmation and before the default, nor for those claims arising after
a bankruptcy court takes jurisdiction which is later determined to be
non-existent.
Lacking specific statutory priorities, upon default of the debtor
most courts classify interim creditors merely as general creditors in the
subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. 1 3 However, some courts have
14
afforded priorities as costs of administration under Section 64(a) (1)
and as provable claims under Section 64(b).'" The failure of jurisdiction problem was first suggested by the recent case of Carolina Motor
Express Lines v. Blue & White Service Inc. 16 A petition for an arrangement under Chapter XI had been presented to the District Court,
October 11, 1950. The debtor was permitted to remain in possession
and operate the business. Over a year later, on October 17, 1951, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of jurisdiction to administer the
plan in the lower court because of certain technical deviations from the
17
requirements of Chapter XI.
The principal danger of a determination of lack of jurisdiction to
the interim creditors is that they will be deprived of any priorities and
be left as resultant general creditors. If, as actually happened in the
Carolina case,' a new plan should be instituted in a court of competent
jurisdiction, these creditors would have to come under the new plan.
Equitable considerations might well dictate a first priority ahead of all
11. Vogel v. Mohawk Elec. Sales Co., 126 F.2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1942); In re Witt
Dairy Co., 48 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1942); It re Gelaradin, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 17
(E.D. N.Y. 1941); In re Ohio Builders & Milling, Inc., 50 Am. B.R.(N.S.) 830
(1941); In re Plymack, 48 Am. B.R.(N.S.) 818 (1941).
12. Carolina Motor Express Lines v. Blue & White Service, 192 F.2d 89 (7th
Cir. 1951).
13. It is generally recognized that the burden of establishing a priority is upon
those asserting the priority and they must show that they come within the intended
class. In re Witt Dairy Company, 48 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1942) ; In re Gelaradin,
Inc., 41 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. N.Y. 1941); In re Paradise Catering Corporation, 36 F.
Supp. (S.D. N.Y. 1941); In re Ohio Builders & Milling, Inc., 50 Am. B.R.(N.S.)
830 (1941).
14 In re Plymack, 48 Am. B.R.(N.S.) 818 (1941).
15. Vogel v. Mohawk Elec. Sales Co., 126 F.2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; In re Irving
Electrical Supply Co., 46 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
16. 192 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1951).
17. The debtor failed to file schedules, or a plan, at the time his petition was
filed, and the court held that he was not entitled to an extension of time for this
purpose. Id. at 92.
18. The cause was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana where the debtor
proposed a new plan. See, Docket, District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Cause

No. 9711 in Bankruptcy.
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other creditors, but varying settlements are possible. Under an arrangement, the classification of debts need not be on any basis recognized in
ordinary bankruptcy. The division of debts in such a plan must accord
with the necessities of the case rather than any specific pattern. 19 It is
unlikely that equitable considerations could be allowed to control should
there be a subsequent bankruptcy adjudication instead of a new plan.
Although a bankruptcy court is generally considered to be equitable in
nature, and its powers must necessarily be so, these powers are to be
administered in accord with the Act and not by virtue of any broad
unlimited equity power. 20 A court may not determine priorities for
distribution on the basis of equitable rules in conflict with the terms of
Section 64.21
In the case of In re Plytmack,22 the debtor filed a voluntary petition
for an arrangement and on confirmation continued the business subject
to the order of the court. The debtor then defaulted and was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt. It was held that the debts incurred in
operating the business after confirmation were entitled to a 64(a) (1)
priority as costs of administration. The court explained that a 64(b)
priority could not be obtained as the arrangement was not "set aside"
within the meaning of that Section. These interim claims were construed to be costs of administration on the ground that the plan had
expressly provided for retention of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court
until fulfillment. This view has not been generally accepted, since a claim
for expenses of administration cannot ordinarily be sustained after confirmation. The period of administration must end no later than the
entry of the order confirming the plan. 23 Even if it seemed advisable
to follow the holding of this court, that such creditors are to be granted
a 64(a) (1) priority, it could not logically be extended to the circumstance in which the court is found to want jurisdiction. The Plyinack
decision is expressly conditioned on the fact that the business was operated under the court's jurisdiction. 4
If a plan is never confirmed the persons who have extended credit
since the introduction of the plan are ordinarily entitled to a 64(a) (1)
19. See

COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

MANUAL

1060 (Oglebay, Kelliher & Newkirk ed.,

1948).
20. It re Judith Gap Commercial Company, 5 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1925).
21. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 2.09 (14th ed., Moore & Mulder, 1940).
22. 48Am. B.R.(N.S.) 818 (1941).
[T]he
23. Vogel v. Mohawk Elec. Sales Co., 126 F.2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1942). "...
period of administration certainly ends no later than the entry of the order of confirmation." Id. at 761.
24. In re Plymack, 48 Am. B.R.(N.S.) 818 (1941). "To constitute expenses of
administration there must be an operation under the jurisdiction of the court, with a
receiver, trustee or debtor-in-possession in operation." Id. at 825.
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priority in the subsequent liquidation. 25 Whether this priority could be
allowed when the plan is defeated because of a lack of jurisdiction and
a bankruptcy results is a matter of conjecture. It might well be concluded
that any action taken under the administration of a court without jurisdiction is void, and thus interim creditors would be relegated to the position of general creditors. Conversely, a 64(a) (1) priority could be
accorded under a liberal interpretation of "costs of administration."
Clarification awaits future legislative or judicial action.
Conceivably, interim creditors might be afforded some consideration
under Section 64(b) 26 when their claims arose after confirmation.
Literally, Section 64(b) provides for priority as a provable claim only
where the plan is set aside, after confirmation, for fraud by the debtor.
However, in Vogel v. Mohawk Electric Sales Co., 27 the Second Circuit

decided that interim creditors were entitled to a 64(b) priority, the arrangement failing due to a non-fraudulent default by the debtor in
carrying out the plan. Judge Learned Hand reasoned that the overriding
Congressional intent behind this Section was protection of the creditors
that furnished the debtor a chance for survival, thereby facilitating the
acquisition of necessary credit by debtors undergoing an arrangement. 28
Hence, he broadly construed a "dismissal" of the arrangement upon
default to be the "setting aside" essential to come within the purview
of 64(b).
It remains to be seen whether a "dismissal for want of jurisdiction"
could be brought within this expansion of Section 64(b). For those
courts willing to adopt the liberal approach of the Vogel case, granting
a 64(b) priority should not be difficult. Interim creditors under an
arrangement eventually found to be without the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court contribute to the debtor's financial rehabilitation at
least as much as where there is dismissal for default, and are equally
deserving of protection. However, this conclusion is somewhat weakened
by the nature of the dismissal involved. The basis for granting priorities
under either Section 64(a) (1) or 64(b) has frequently been the retention of jurisdiction by the court during the fulfillment of the plan,
25. See note 10 supra.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1946), which provides, "Debts contracted while a discharge
is in force or after the confirmation of an arrangement shall, in the event of a
revocation of the discharge or setting aside of the confirmation, have priority and be
paid in full in advance of the payment of the debts which were provable in the
bankruptcy or arrangement proceeding, as the case may be."
27. 126 F.2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1942).
28. Id. at 761. ".... [T]he underlying theory must be that he shall have a chance
to establish himself again, and that he cannot have unless he can do business upon equal
+:rms with his competitors; it is idle to ask him to fight his way with one arm tied."
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or a specific provision in the plan for the granting of such a priority. 2
Where the court is finally found to want jurisdiction, these important
factors are lacking and any action the court has taken in administering
the plan may be void. Nevertheless, if the basic theories of the Vogel
case are correct they might well override other considerations.
Assuming that a 64(b) priority is granted to parties that advance
credit after confirmation, the nature of this priority is uncertain. There
is a theory30 that Section 64(b) may afford creditors given that priority
precedence over all other ,'laims.81 Such a construction would be in
accord with the intention of Congress to provide the greatest protection
for interim creditors, and better conform with the statutory scheme of
priorities. Nevertheless, Section 64(b) states in clear and unequivocable
language that 64(b) claims shall have priority only over other provable
claim-.3 2 Therefore, 64(b) claims would follow non-provable claims
in order of precedence. Provable claims, other than those coming under
Section 64(b), are those existing when the petition for an arrangement
is filed. 33 Non-provable claims are those arising subsequent to the petition and not falling within 64(b). At present, the rank in order of
priorities given to 64(b) creditors remains undecided.
The existing doubts in this area of the Bankruptcy Act are inimical
to the certainty necessary to dissipate the reluctance of potential creditors
to deal with businesses undergoing the hazardous ordeal of an arrangement. Furtherance of the rehabilitory purposes of the Act would be
enhanced by an amendment providing a first priority to all interim
creditors should there be an eventual bankruptcy, regardless of whether
the plan of arrangement terminated because of inability to reach an
accord with creditors, refusal of confirmation, fraud, default, or failure
34
of jurisdiction.
29. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPrcY 1164.602 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay, 1941) and
cases cited.
30. Id. at 111 64.601, 64.602.

31. Id. at p. 2 187 .
32. Specifically enumerated in Section 63 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1946).
33. Unquestionably, Congress has the power to designate what claims are, and
what claims are not, provable in bankruptcy proceedings. City Farmers Bank Trust
Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433 (1937) ; West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irr.
Dist., 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940).
34. To the contrary, it has been suggested that Section 64(b) be repealed, and a
bill was introduced in Congress for that purpose on August 7, 1951. The bill is
presently before the House Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 5064, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951).

